Monday, November 19, 2012

Entitlement to just compensation for standing crops & improvements

A mere lessee of an agricultural land has no right under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) to demand for just compensation for its standing crops and improvements from the Land Bank. Its rights as lessee are totally independent of and unaffected by any judgment rendered in an agrarian case. The CARL does not contain any proviso recognizing the rights of a lessee of a private agricultural land to just compensation for the crops it planted and improvements it built. Just compensation for the produce and infrastructure of a private agricultural land logically belongs to the landowner since the former are part and parcel of the latter. The DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership over standing crops and improvements between the landowner and the lessee. This is so, because the right of a lessor and lessee over the improvements introduced by the latter is not an agrarian dispute within the meaning of the CARL. Since lease contract is governed by the Civil Code provisions on lease, it is the Regional Trial Court, as a court of general jurisdiction that can resolve with finality the rights of a lessor and lessee over the improvements built by the latter (G.R. No. 187801, Sept. 13, 2012).

Sunday, November 11, 2012

Retrenchment

Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery or of automation. For a valid retrenchment, the following elements must be present:
(1)    That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;

(2)    That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;

(3)    That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;

(4)    That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and

(5)    That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers

Granting a demurrer to evidence..


Supreme Court Reinstates Dismissal of Libel Cases Due to Procedural Defect

Posted: November 9, 2012; By Bianca M. Padilla

The Supreme Court has recently ordered the reinstatement of the portion of the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong, Branch 212, which dismissed the libel suits filed by singer-actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara for the alleged defamatory articles against her published in the tabloid Bandera. Bautista and Alcantara are Bandera’s Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively. Also charged with libel is Pete G. Ampoloquio, the author of the articles.
The RTC Mandaluyong had ordered the libel suits dismissed insofar as petitioners are concerned after granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by them alleging that the prosecution had failed to prove their participation as conspirators of the crime charged. Respondent Cuneta-Pangilinan then filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) which the latter granted. The CA also ordered the cases against petitioners to be remanded to the trial court.
In a 19-page decision penned by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, the Court's Third Division unanimously granted petitioners’ petition for review of the CA’s decision. The Court held that petitioners “can no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for certiorari [filed by Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan] was not undertaken by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), but instead by respondent in her personal capacity. Moreover, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally enshrined right against double jeopardy.”
The Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Santiago that “[i]n criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or private offended party is limited to the civil liability… If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be taken only by the State through the Solicitor General… However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect of the case despite the acquittal of the accused.” The Court found that in this case, the petition filed before the CA by Cuneta-Pangilinan essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the RTC’s order of dismissal.
The Court stressed that the granting of a Demurrer to Evidence is tantamount to a dismissal of the case on the merits and a “review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy.” (GR No. 189754, Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, October 24, 2012)