SC allows lawyer who re-acquired philippine citizenship to practice law.

The Supreme Court En Banc has recently granted the petition of a lawyer to practice law in the Philippines once again after losing the said privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America in 1981 and then re-acquiring his Philippine citizenship in 2006 pursuant to RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.

The Court further directed the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar.  

In a six-page resolution penned by Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, the Court unanimously held that upon favorable recommendation from the OBC, Atty. Epifanio B. Muneses satisfactorily complied with all the requirements sought by the OBC and met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the Bar. In particular, he had submitted in compliance the following: 1) Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship; 2) Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship); 3) Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 4) Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the Identification Certificate; 5) Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues; 6) Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010; 7) Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and 8) Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

“The Court sees no bar to the petitioner’s resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines,” the Court declared, subject to the condition that Atty. Muneses re-take the Lawyer’s Oath and pay the appropriate fee.  

The Court reiterated that Filipino citizenship is a continuing requirement for the practice of law, loss of which means the termination of one’s membership in the Bar and the privilege to engage in the practice of law. “Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country but later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar,” it added. It also noted that the right to resume the practice of law, however, is not automatic and Section 5 of RA 9225 states that a person who “intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for the license or permit to engage in such practice.” (BM No. 2112, In Re: Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, Petitioner, July 24, 2012)

attorney-client relationship

An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his 

professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to 

his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice 

thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or 

advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open 

court.

Congress representation in JBC

The Supreme Court today allowed Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. to both sit in the deliberations of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on who would be included in the short list of nominees for Chief Justice to be submitted to Malacañang.

The High Court’s directive came a day after it heard in oral arguments the motion for reconsideration of its July 17, 2012 decision filed by the Office of the Solicitor General representing Sen. Escudero and Rep. Tupas, Jr., on the Court’s July 17, 2012 decision on GR No. 202242, Francisco I. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, which held that only one member of Congress can sit as representative in the JBC deliberations.

In a three-page resolution, the Court also suspended the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 decision, which reads: “This disposition is immediately executory.

The Court, in its latest resolution, also gave the JBC, Sen. Escudero, Rep. Tupas, Jr., and Francisco I. Chavez 10 days from notice within which to file their respective memoranda.

In the best interest of justice, the High Court also held that all its present members, including those who in the meantime have inhibited themselves, be given the opportunity to take part in the final deliberations and resolution of the petition considering the risk of either under-representation or over-representation of Congress in the JBC.

“The Court finds it more equitable for the present members of the JBC to resume their task of selecting nominees for the vacant position of the Chief Justice. Accordingly, pending the final resolution of this petition, Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas, Jr., in their capacities as representatives of Congress, may simultaneously sit as ex officio members of the JBC and exercise the functions flowing therefrom,” held the Court.

SC Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, who presided the JBC panel interview of the candidates for the position of the next Chief Justice held from July 24 to 27, 2012, also presided during the oral arguments held on Wednesday, August 2, 2012. Also participating in the oral argument were SC Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes, Jose Portugal Perez, Roberto A. Abad, Lucas P. Bersamin, Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. 

Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno inhibited from the oral arguments as they are among those considered for nomination by the JBC to the Chief Justice post. (Min. Res., GR 202242,Chavez v. JBC, August 3, 2012)

PAGC abolished

The Supreme Court En Banc has unanimously dismissed the petition of Prospero Pichay, Jr., former Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWAU), questioning the constitutionality of EO 13 (Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring its Investigative, Adjudicatory, and Recommendatory Functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President). Pichay was investigated for grave misconduct in the performance of his duties by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa by virtue of the said EO.

In the 22-page decision penned by Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, the Court ruled that Pichay failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of EO 13. It ruled that the abolition of OAGC and the transfer of functions to IAD-ODESLA is within the prerogative of the President as Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly “vests in the President the authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” The Court stressed that both offices belong to the Office of the President Proper.

The Court held that the reorganization was a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the existing structure of ODESLA through the establishment of a Third Division - Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under EO 13. Moreover, the Court held that the reorganization was done in good faith as it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.

EO 13 also does not usurp on the legislative power to appropriate funds even if it does not allocate a specific amount for the IAD-ODESLA in the annual budget of the Office of the President since the 1987 Constitution provides that “the President may augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.” As such, the President is merely allocating the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office, the Court explained.

The Court also ruled that IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers since it did not have the power to settle controversies nor adjudicate cases. Neither does EO 13 encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman as the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is to investigate and prosecute criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan while IAD-ODESLA only deals with administrative cases. The Court stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate elective and appointive officials in the government is not exclusive.

The Court likewise noted that EO 13 did not violate Pichay’s right to due process and equal protection. “In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,” it declared. Citing Farinas v. Executive Secretary, it held that “the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies alike to all persons within such class.” Moreover, it noted that along with the President’s power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees comes the authority to investigate such public officials. (GR No. 196425, Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, July 24, 2012)