Wednesday, November 30, 2011

SC Disbars Lawyer

Lawyers should not deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession and must immediately return the money/property when due or upon demand. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Lawyering is not a business, it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
The Supreme Court recently disbarred a lawyer for obtaining money from a client without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the insurance proceeds of the client's husband (A.C. No. 6246. Freeman v. Reyes, November 15, 2011).

SC Dismisses Petition Assailing EO giving CESO Rank to Gov't Lawyers

In a unanimous En Banc decision the Supreme Court found no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon the validity of EO 883 as the said Executive Order had already been revoked by EO 3 issued by President Aquino. The Court ruled that to pass upon the validity of EO 883 would transgress the requirement of case and controversy as precondition for the Court's exercise of judicial review. The Court also ruled that petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883. 
In the said EO 883 issued by then President Arroyo, officers and employees "occupying legal positions in the government executive service" who have obtained graduate degrees in law and successfully passed the Bar examinations were granted the rank of CESO III (G.R. No. 192926, Sana v. CESB, November 15, 2011)

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

DISSENTING OPINION, J. Sereno

The Rules of Court and Jurisprudence prescribe very stringent requirements before a Temporary Restraining Order can be issued. Among these is the requirement that the Temporary Restraining Order "may be granted only when: (a) application or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded xxx". So strong is the requirement of truthful allegations in the pleadings filed before the Court that many adverse inferences and disciplinary measures can be imposed against a person lying before the Court. This requirement of truthfulness is especially important when a provisional remedy, and more so when the remedy is sought to be granted ex-parte, is under consideration by the Court. When on its face, the material averments of a pleading contain self-contradictions, the least that the Court should do, is consider the other side of the claim. This is the situation with the Petition of the former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It appears that she has given inconsistent, and probably untruthful statements before this Court.
Petitioner's travel itinerary abroad, for which the instant provisional remedy is being sought, appears not solely for medical reasons as claimed. If there is indeed some medical urgency and necessity for the petitioner to travel abroad, these should logically be limited only to locations where she seeks medical advice from known experts in the field. Why then should there be other countries of destinations that are included in her travel authority but not specifically mentioned for purposes of medical consultations? Contrary to her assertions of urgency and life-threatening health condition, petitioner had expressed her intention to participate in two conferences abroad during her supposed medical tour. It seems incongruous for petitioner who has asked the Department of Justice and this Court to look with humanitarian concern on her precarious state of health, to commit herself to attend these meetings and conferences at the risk of worsening her physical condition.
If she has been shown to be prone to submitting to this Court documents belying her own allegations, this Court must pause, and at the very least, listen to the side of the Government.. (Justice Sereno dissenting, voted to defer the action on the TRO; G.R. No. 199034 and G.R. No. 199046, November 15, 2011).

Monday, November 7, 2011

contumacious conduct

A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly is disrespect to the Court's lawful order and directive. This conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system.

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Grave Misconduct

A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the established rule are present. While great respect is accorded to the factual findings of administrative agencies that misconduct was committed, but no substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the established rule, then the offense cannot be characterized as grave. It is only simple misconduct.

Government Employee's Plea of Privacy

The Supreme Court has recently held that the search by the government of an employee's office computer in connection with an investigation into work-related misconduct does not violate the employees constitutional right to privacy. 
The search was occasioned by an anonymous letter-complaint to the Civil Service Commission accusing the petitioner of lawyering for the parties with pending cases with the Civil Service Commission. The CSC Chairperson issued a Memorandum directing the Investigating Team to conduct investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamayan Muna and Legal Divisions." It was found out that most files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the Civil Service Commission and other tribunals. The Supreme Court found tenable the CSC's argument that the warrantless search of the computers was justified since "these furnished the easiest means for the employee to encode and store documents. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action." The Court further held that there was no violation of petitioner's right to privacy as this was negated by the CSC's policy regulating the use of office computers in its Memorandum No. 10, series of 2002 that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers (Pollo v. David, G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011).